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THE LAW, RACE RELATIONS, AND THE
ROSEBUD RESERVATION
David L. Garelick†
Deadliest Enemies: Law and the Making of Race Relations On and
Off the Rosebud Reservation. By Thomas Biolsi. University of California
Press, 2001. 232 pages. $35.00.
1

The central question posed by Thomas Biolsi in his book is:
how did conflictual race relations come to be so deeply embedded
in the social fabric of South Dakota? In grappling with that
troubling question, Biolsi presents a comprehensive analysis of the
conflict between Indian people and their white neighbors on and
around the Rosebud Reservation. His focus on the history of a
single tribe provides an excellent survey of some of the most critical
issues in the field of federal Indian law. The depth of his study may
also challenge practitioners to rethink their own basic assumptions
2
regarding the root causes of racial tensions in Indian country.
† David Garelick graduated from the William Mitchell College of Law in
1998. He practices civil, criminal and federal Indian law as an associate at the firm
of Larry Leventhal & Associates, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. Thomas Biolsi is a Professor of Anthropology at Portland State University.
He is the author of THOMAS BIOLSI, ORGANIZING THE LAKOTA: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW DEAL ON THE PINE RIDGE AND ROSEBUD RESERVATIONS (1992),
and coeditor of INDIANS AND ANTHROPOLOGISTS: VINE DELORIA, JR., AND THE
CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY (Thomas Biolsi & Larry J. Zimmerman, eds., 1997).
2. The term “Indian country” is defined generally for criminal purposes in
18 U.S.C. § 1151 as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this Title,
the term “Indian country” as used in this chapter means (a) all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including any rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States, whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of the state, and (c)
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2001). Although the United States Supreme Court has noted
the relevancy of this definition in some civil matters, its significance for purposes
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Professor Biolsi recognizes that one of the core assumptions in
federal Indian law is the “deadliest enemies” hypothesis. This
hypothesis, which was enunciated by the United States Supreme
3
Court in its 1886 United States v. Kagama decision, has taken root in
both legal and lay circles alike. It assumes that the deadliest
enemies of Indian tribes are the local non-Indians who live both in
and around territory designated as Indian country. Indeed, this
reader recalls that during his first class in federal Indian law, the
instructor wryly stated that even if nothing else were imparted
during the semester, students would do well to remember that the
states remain the deadliest enemies of the tribes. Sadly, practice to
date seems to confirm as much.
By way of introduction, Biolsi states that he will examine
Indian-white relations by focusing on federal Indian law as a
discourse comprising not only legal texts, but the interplay between
texts, statements, practices, local knowledges, and social
arrangements. He then makes it clear that he intends to
demonstrate that this discourse structures practical thought and
action, that it has done much by itself to demarcate political
interests along racial lines and thereby produce racial politics and
racial tensions in local settings.
Another stated aim of the book is to show that the “central
energizer of the discourse—what drives its reproduction and its
racial productivity” is the rampant contradiction in federal Indian
law. While acknowledging that law in general is rife with
inconsistency, Biolsi recognizes that federal Indian law is fraught
with an exceptional degree of contradiction and indeterminacy,
and the resulting uncertainty affects Indian-white race relations. In
this context, he reviews some of the familiar contradictions present
4
at the very creation of Indian law and seizes upon what he
of civil jurisdiction will vary depending on the circumstances. See AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW DESKBOOK 35 (Nicholas J. Spaeth et al. eds., 1993).
3. 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (stating “because of local ill feeling, the people
of the States where [Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies”).
4. Two of the well established contradictions which Biolsi discusses are as
follows: (1) The Declaration of Independence contains a racist binary in that it
“counterpoises” men created equal against (later in the text) merciless Indian
savages who would be denied the rights of men; and (2) The doctrine of discovery
enabled the Europeans to take possession of North America, despite the
occupancy of the natives, who were relegated to “heathen” status at the time;
therefore, Indians were excluded from the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s
private property protections. See THOMAS BIOLSI, DEADLIEST ENEMIES: LAW AND THE
M AKING OF RACE RELATIONS ON AND OFF THE ROSEBUD RESERVATION 11-12 (2001)
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characterizes as “the central tension animating the history of law
and policy pertaining to American Indians in the United States—a
conflict between Indian nations construed as members of distinct
5
(sovereign) nations, and as a people within the United States.” Put
differently, Professor Biolsi states that the conflict can also be
viewed as one between treaty rights, which belong to a unique
people, (where Tribes and their members are seen as legally
different from other Americans) and constitutional rights (where
Indians are seen as basically the same as other Americans—“and to
6
whom the same rules should, and eventually must, apply”).
To further complicate matters, Professor Biolsi reminds us that
Indian law has evolved over a historical sequence of contradictory
moments of “assimilation” and “separatism,” which take their force
from the political and judicial policy in ascendancy during a given
7
point in time. He then states that, for purposes of his study, it is
critical to recognize that the law produced during all of these
periods remains good law. “Law that was meant to do away with
tribes and reservations and civilize or otherwise assimilate Indians
remains in effect, as does law meant to protect and make
permanent Indian treaty rights and the sovereignty of native
8
nations.” In an attempt to convey the full impact of this state of
contradiction in federal Indian law, Professor Biolsi suggests that it
might be appreciated if we could imagine what it would be like if
the laws of slavery and the constitutional amendments which
9
outlawed slavery, or if Plessy v. Ferguson, and Brown v. Board of
10
Education, all remained equally “good law” in the present.
The upshot of all the contradictory law from different
historical periods that remains valid is that when rights are asserted
in Indian country, which inevitably concern the rights of Indian
people versus the rights of non-Indians, litigants come to court with

[hereinafter “BIOLSI”].
5. BIOLSI, supra note 4, at 13.
6. See id.
7.
For example, the last century of Indian policy in the United States is
typically divided into the following sequence of four periods: (1) the “civilization”
period, 1880-1934 (uniformity/assimilation); (2) the Indian New Deal, 1934-1950
(uniqueness/separatism);
(3)
the
“termination”
period,
1956-1968
(uniformity/assimilation); and (4) the “self-determination” period, 1968 to date,
(uniqueness/separatism). See BIOLSI, supra note 4, at 14-16.
8. See BIOLSI, supra note 4, at 16.
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. 347 U.S. 438 (1954).
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legally compelling but profoundly contradictory sets of law. For
example, when the Rosebud Sioux Tribe enacted its uniform
commercial code in 1989 (pursuant to the Tribe’s sovereign power
to exercise some form of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians), local
non-Indians routinely complained that the requirement was
tantamount to taxation without representation since they had no
vote in Tribal matters (in violation of their well settled
12
constitutional rights).
Further, this pervasive contradiction
propagates litigation and judicial close calls and reversals, which
are often based on technicalities that only pretend to reconcile the
13
opposing sets of law. Consequently, claims for substantive rights
remain unsettled even after judgments have been rendered,
because losers are typically unsatisfied with court decisions that
they perceive as having been “settled” on the basis of technicalities
14
and with complete disregard for the plain language of the law.
The unfortunate result, according to Professor Biolsi, is that
“litigation over race based rights-claims is necessarily a zero-sum
political game, in which wins for Indian people represent losses for
15
whites, and vice versa.”
After introducing his book by making the case that, rather
than mediating local ill feeling, Indian law serves to provoke racial
tension, political struggle and litigation, Biolsi then provides a
short history of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. The Fort Laramie Treaty
of 1868 established the Great Sioux Reservation, which included, as
the “permanent home” of the Lakota, the entire western half of
present-day South Dakota. In 1889, the Great Sioux Agreement
established Rosebud and other reservations. In addition to having
the same legal force as a treaty, the Agreement was also a product
of the federal government’s policy of civilizing Indians through the
institution of private property, “as envisioned in the General
16
Allotment Act (or Dawes Act) of 1887.” It is now well-known that
11. Id. at 17.
12. See BIOLSI, supra note 4, at 153-163.
13. Id. at 17-18.
14. Id. at 18.
15. Id.
16. See BIOLSI, supra note 4, at 20-21; see also PETER M ATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT
OF CRAZY HORSE 17-19 (1983).
In remarks to philanthropists in 1885, Senator Henry L. Dawes,
disapproving of the Indians’ communism huffed that ‘They have got as
far as they can go, because they own their own land in common.’ He
also observed that ‘There is no selfishness, which is at the bottom of
civilization.’ Teddy Roosevelt characterized the legislation as ‘a might
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another purpose of the Allotment Act was to open up great tracts
of land to the non-Indian homesteaders flooding the prairies.
Thus, the Great Sioux Agreement also provided for the allotment
of the reservation lands it established, and it purported to “restore”
eleven million acres outside the separate reservations to the public
17
domain.
18
Allotment of the Rosebud Reservation commenced in 1893.
19
In 1906, Congress passed the Burke Act, which authorized the
secretary of the interior to issue a patent-in-fee simple for an
allotment. As a result,
Todd County/Rosebud Reservation quickly became
‘checkerboarded’ with non-Indian lands, and the nonIndian population quickly rose . . .. Todd County . . . was
a subdivision of the state of South Dakota, where taxable
land existed and where state citizens – both non-Indians
and, arguably
fee-patented Indians – were subject to state
20
jurisdiction.
The devastating depletion of the national Indian land estate
through the allotment process is generally described in terms of
21
total acreage lost: 86 million acres between 1887 and 1934.
Biolsi’s book scrupulously tracks the jurisdictional struggles that
arose directly from allotment in and around the Rosebud
Reservation. In so doing, his study complements a more general
understanding of the Indian land base lost nationwide by bringing
home, in a manner of speaking, the jurisdictional havoc that
resulted from checkerboarding. In fact, the bulk of his book is
devoted to the litigation and the political struggles between the
Tribe and the State of South Dakota and its white citizens over the
boundaries of the Reservation and over how the “political space” of
Rosebud/Todd County is to be organized. Respective chapters
chronicle a struggle in the mid-1970s over the boundaries of the
Rosebud Reservation; a dispute in the 1980s over a liquor store in
the city of Mission, which was incorporated within the boundaries
of the Rosebud Reservation; a conflict between the Tribe and the
State over jurisdiction on highways running through the
pulverizing machine to break up the tribal mass.’
Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See BIOLSI, supra note 4, at 210.
Id. at 122.
Ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2001)).
BIOLSI, supra note 4, at 28.
See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 20 (1995).
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Reservation; and the assertion of tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians living on the Reservation.
Biolsi asks why jurisdictional issues have become the central
struggle and tries to show the consequences of this fact. He
answers by arguing that the discourse of federal Indian law both
creates and limits the types of rights and claims that are actionable,
both politically and legally, for Indian people: “[i]t creates a
determinate channel of allowable grievances that must suffice for
those grappling with a much larger range of systemic domination
22
and social injustice.” Thus, jurisdictional rights claims bear the
heavy burden of addressing the whole picture of Indian
23
oppression.
Biolsi emphasizes that he is not critiquing
jurisdictional struggle under the aegis of sovereignty as somehow
24
inauthentic. Rather, he is making the point that, at present, it is
the only practical way to address more wide-ranging oppressions.
“And this is why Indian people respond aggressively to even
apparently minor assertions of local self-government by
subdivisions of the state, which are seen as racism by Indian
25
people.”
Biolsi also makes it clear that a central argument of his book is
that Indians and non-Indians were compelled to become enemies
26
by forces beyond their control. He observes that, despite clear
differences, the similar class/regional situation of Indian and nonIndian people who become enemies (over local jurisdictional
27
struggles) can potentially be a strong unifier. In this context, he
asks whether it is reasonable to wonder why these so-called enemies
fail to entertain their common interests against the powerful
outside forces that bring them, among other things,
unemployment, the lack of child-care services and the general de-

22. See BIOLSI, supra note 4, at 181-182.
23. See id. at 181.
24. He does, however, join those who observe that:
[b]y the logic of Indian self-determination and autonomous
nationhood as structured by the discourse of federal Indian law, the
more tribal sovereignty is formally realized under existing federal
Indian law, the more difficult it is for [Indian] people to make credible
legal and political claims regarding the full range of daily forms of
oppression they are subjected to.
See id. at 189.
25. Id. at 190.
26. See id. at 198.
27. See id. at 195.
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28

funding of social programs.
In his conclusion, Biolsi argues that the Indian law discourse
does not merely have the political effect of inciting local people to
become enemies. He challenges us by asserting that its most
critical effect is the production of white innocence. “By making
local white and Indian people highly visible deadliest enemies, the
discourse of Indian leaves in the shade we other whites who might
otherwise be called to account in the native struggle for racial
29
justice.”
Biolsi ends his meticulously researched book by asking us to be
vigilant and recognize that the discourse of Indian law is not driven
by a will to racial justice that guarantees its humane unfolding.
That said, he optimistically advises that American Indian people
have historically used the law in ways unforeseen or unintended by
the elites who wrote it and that we should expect nothing less in
the future. “The law – federal Indian law or some other kind – will
continue to be at the center of the struggle for justice for native
30
people, and for us all.” Let us hope that Professor Biolsi is not
mistaken.

28.
29.
30.

See id.
Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 210.
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